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1 Introduction
Since the original contribution by Nelson (1970), experience goods have been dened as
those products whose true quality is only learned upon consuming the good. As a result,
any consumer choice model of experience goods must combine the perishable goods nature
of repeat purchases with the durable information resulting from consumption. In this pa-
per, we develop a simple tractable model of optimal pricing for a monopolist that sells an
experience good over time to a population of potential buyers. We nd that di¤erent types
of experience goods induce qualitatively di¤erent long run outcomes depending on whether
the short run perishable attributes or the long run informational features of the product
are the most important in the purchasing decisions.
In an experience goods market, the seller is facing simultaneously two di¤erent sub-
markets. The demand curve in the part of the population that has already learned its
preferences is similar to the standard textbook treatment. Those buyers that are uncertain
about the true quality of the product must behave in a more sophisticated manner. Each
current consumption decision incorporates a decision of information acquisition that is rel-
evant for repeat purchases at future dates. The value of this information is endogenously
determined in the market. If future prices are very high, current purchases are unlikely to
yield information that results in future consumer surpluses. If future prices are low, then it
may be in the buyers best interest to forego purchases in the current period as future prices
are attractive regardless of the true value of the product. As a result, current and future
prices determine simultaneously the sales in the informed segment of the market, and they
also determine the value of information for the uninformed segment.
The model in this paper is an innite horizon, continuous time model of monopoly
pricing. There is a continuum of ex ante identical consumers that have a unit demand per
period for the purely perishable good. At each instant of time, the monopolist o¤ers a spot
price and the buyers decide whether to purchase or not. In the beginning of the game,
all buyers are uncertain about their true preferences. If they purchase the product, they
observe with positive probability a perfectly informative signal. We assume for analytical
convenience that these signals arrive according to a Poisson process. The true preferences
are modeled by a single parameter that represents the buyers willingness to pay for the
product, and we assume that the aggregate distribution of preferences in the population is
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common knowledge between all players. The key feature of the model is then that di¤erent
buyers become informed at di¤erent times. As a result, the market is segmented at each
point in time and the degree of segmentation depends on the prices that the monopolist
sets. Hence the model incorporates elements of demand management and market building
We treat separately two specications for the buyer side of the market. In the rst model,
we assume that the same set of buyers is present in all periods. In our view this is the right
assumption for analyzing the launching phase of new products. The second model deals
with a changing set of buyers using a conventional steady state analysis in a market where
the buyers enter and exit at exogenously given rates. This is a more appropriate modeling
choice for mature markets.
To x ideas, consider the pharmaceutical market. In that industry, each new drug
undergoes an extensive period of pre-launch testing to ascertain its performance with respect
to the overall population. The aggregate uncertainty relating to the product has hence
been reduced to a large extent at the moment of introduction. Yet many drugs di¤er
in their e¤ectiveness and incidence of side e¤ects across agents. The uncertainty about
the idiosyncratic value of the drug then provides a strong motive for the individual agent
to experiment. In fact, a recent empirical study by Crawford & Shum (2003) regarding
the dynamic demand behavior in pharmaceutical markets documents the important role of
idiosyncratic uncertainty and learning in explaining demand.1 For a data set of anti-ulcer
descriptions, they observe substantial uncertainty about the idiosyncratic e¤ectiveness of the
individual drugs and high precision in the signals received through consumption experience.
We model the e¤ectiveness of the new treatment to an individual new patient as a random
event. The time of response to the drug is random and the response may be either positive
or negative (successful recovery from the illness or severe side e¤ects).
Our main result is that the qualitative features of the equilibrium market outcome
depend on a rather simple intertemporal comparison. In the full information benchmark
where all of the buyers have learned their true preferences for the good, the monopolist sets
1The empirical literature on learning based models in pharmaceutical demand is growing rapidly. Ching
(2002) provides structural, dynamic demand estimates when there is learning among patients about a new
(generic) pharmaceutical with common values. Coscelli & Shum (forthcoming) estimate the impact of
uncertainty and learning for the introduction of a new drug. The role of information is also central in
Bhattacharya & Vogt (2003), where a model and preliminary estimates regarding informative marketing for
new pharmaceutical products are presented.
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the price of the good at the textbook monopoly price. Consider the incentives of a single
new consumer that enters the market in its long run full information equilibrium. A new
consumer does not know if she likes the product su¢ ciently much to purchase the product
in the long run at the monopoly price. She must calculate the expected consumer surplus
from potential future purchases and compare that to the (possible) short run losses that
may result from purchases at the monopoly prices. If the uninformed buyer is willing to
purchase the good at the long run monopoly price, we call the market optimistic, if she is
not willing to buy the product, we call the market pessimistic. Theorem 1 shows that in
the optimistic case, the long run equilibrium price converges to the full information price
and the long run sales also converge to full information sales levels. In the pessimistic
case, long run prices also converge to full information levels, but sales levels fall short of
the full information monopoly sales. We also show that the equilibrium price paths take
quite di¤erent shapes in these two cases. In the optimistic case, the monopolist skims the
more attractive part of the market (i.e. the uninformed buyers) as long as protable. In
the pessimistic case, the monopolist o¤ers low initial prices to capture a larger share of
the uninformed at the expense of targeting the more attractive informed segment of the
market. When new buyers enter the market, we show that neither long run prices nor long
run quantities will converge to full information levels in general. In the optimistic case,
the optimal steady state price is constant, but in the pessimistic case, for some parameter
values, the optimal price path exhibits price dispersion.
We also examine the welfare properties of such markets. Since information on product
quality is a durable good, we ask in the Coasian tradition how a monopolists power to
commit to future prices a¤ects the market outcomes. In the optimistic case, commitment
can be shown to be welfare reducing as a longer period of skimming the market becomes
feasible. In the pessimistic case, however, commitment is benecial from the welfare point
of view. Under commitment, the optimal long run prices are below the full information
monopoly price and the resulting consumer surplus is extracted from the buyers through
higher initial prices. The welfare losses in the early periods are more than o¤set by the
gains in the late periods.
To our knowledge, the current paper is the rst to address the issue of experimental
consumption in a fully dynamic model with a population of heterogenous buyers. One of
the contributions of this paper is then to provide a tractable analytical framework that is
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suitable for the study of similar issues in related contexts. In the conclusion to this paper,
we suggest some avenues for further research within the same modelling framework.
Monopoly models dealing with issues of dynamic pricing include Milgrom & Roberts
(1986), Farrell (1986) and Tirole (1988). All of these models make the assumption that the
perceived quality is either high or otherwise of no value and the main emphasis is on vertical
di¤erentiation between the buyers. Furthermore these models have only a two period hori-
zon. We view both of these restrictions as unnecessary and unrealistic in many situations.
Our model allows for the possibility that the monopolist discriminates intertemporally in
the market in a more exible manner and as a result, our conclusions are quite di¤erent
from those in the earlier literature. In our model, it is possible that the marginal buyer
in the later periods might have a lower willingness to pay for quality than the marginal
buyer in the earlier periods and as a result, buyers have an incentive to engage in experi-
mental consumption. Cremer (1984) considers a model with initially identical buyers and
idiosyncratic experience to explain coupons and entry fees for shopping clubs. In a recent
contribution, Villas-Boas (2004a) considers the equilibrium in a duopoly model with hori-
zontal and vertical di¤erentiation with two periods. The horizontal di¤erentiation is known
whereas the vertical di¤erentiation is uncertain and idiosyncratic and learned by experience.
Villas-Boas (2004b) provides an extension to an innite horizon model.
Finally, conditions for initially high prices have been obtained in asymmetric information
models of entry. In those papers, the monopolist is assumed to know the true value of the
product, and the prices chosen serve as signals of the true quality. A prominent example of
such models is Bagwell & Riordan (1991) where high and declining prices serve as signals
of high product quality. Judd & Riordan (1994) consider a model with initially symmetric
information where private signals are received by the monopolist and the buyers after rst
period choices. The rm then faces a signaling problem in the second period. The results
in these models depend on the details of the information revelation mechanism and the
cost structure. In our model, the results depend only on the quality di¤erence between the
products which can in principle be inferred directly from the realized prices.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the basic model and discusses the
appropriate solution concepts. Section 3 represents the intertemporal decision problems of
buyers and seller by dynamic programming equations and introduces the relevant option
values. Section 4 analyzes the market with a single cohort of buyer. Section 5 considers
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the case where the monopolist can commit to a sequence of future prices. Section 6 deals
with the steady-state analysis of the market where the buyers enter and exit the market.
Section 7 concludes and discusses future extensions of the current work. The proofs of all
the results are collected in the Appendix.
2 Model
We consider a continuous time model with t 2 [0;1) and a positive discount rate r > 0.
A monopolist with a zero marginal cost of production o¤ers a single product for sale in a
market consisting of a continuum of consumers. For analytical simplicity, we assume that
the buyers have unit demand for the product within periods, and that the product is not
storable. We also abstract from the possibility of price di¤erentiation within periods. At
each instant, the monopolist starts the game by setting the spot price. Upon seeing the
price, all consumers decide whether to purchase or not.
Each consumer is characterized by her idiosyncratic willingness to pay for the product :
The good is an experience good and therefore the true value of each individual  is initially
unknown to the buyers as well as to the seller. The ex ante distribution of buyer types is
given by a continuously di¤erentiable distribution function F () with support [l; h]  R:
This distribution is assumed to be common knowledge and this reects our assumption
that there is no aggregate uncertainty in the model. As the focus in this paper is on
private individual experiences, we abstract from possible common sources of uncertainty.
To simplify the analysis, we also require that [1 F ()] be strictly quasiconcave in : This
assumption guarantees that the full information problem is well behaved.
All buyers are ex ante identical, and their utility from consuming the product prior to
learning their type is given by v where
v ,
Z h
l
dF () .
Throughout the paper, we assume that a perfectly informative signal (e.g. the emergence
of side e¤ects in a drug therapy) arrives at a constant Poisson rate dt for all buyers that
purchase the product in a time instant of length dt:2 In this case, the posterior distribution
2 It might be natural to allow for cases where  depends on t: In the pharmaceutical example, such a
time-varying arrival rate might reect e.g. the decline in the probability of a treatment being eventually
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on  remains constant at the prior until the signal is observed.3 The most important
analytical consequence of this assumption for our analysis is that conditional on not having
observed a signal, the buyers are identical. Upon the arrival of the signal, buyers become
heterogenous and the monopolists key objective is to manage the endogenous composition
of these two market segments.
As we analyze the dynamic behavior of the market, it is natural to use dynamic pro-
gramming tools to derive the equilibrium conditions for the model. For consistency with
the rest of the modeling, we assume that the only observable variables in each period are
the prices and aggregate quantities. This is in line with the assumption that each individual
buyer is small and has no strategic impact on the aggregate outcomes. The state variable of
the model at each instant t is the fraction of agents that have become informed. We denote
this fraction by  (t) 2 [0; 1] : Even though  (t) is not directly observable to the players, it
can be calculated from the equilibrium purchasing strategies.4
A pure Markovian behavior strategy of the seller is given by
p : [0; 1]! R:
The price is thus a function of the state variable  2 [0; 1] only. A Markovian strategy of
an uninformed buyer is given by
du : [0; 1] R! f0; 1g .
In this decision rule, 0 indicates no purchases and 1 indicates a purchase. This decision
depends on the current price as well as the current state of the system.
The Markovian strategy of the informed buyer is denoted by
di : [l; h] [0; 1] R! f0; 1g ,
and it depends on the price and the state as well as her private valuation of the object.
successful given a number of unsuccessful trials. We have analyzed this possibility, but given that the
qualitative features of the model remain the same, we report only the constant case.
3This assumption is made for the ease of exposition only. We have also computed the model for posteriors
with positive and negative drift. Again, the qualitative features of the solution are the same as in the constant
case.
4Here we are assuming a law of large numbers for our continuum population case. This is not problematic
since independence is not required in our model with anonymity among the buyers.
7
The evolution of the market state variable, conditional on the uninformed buying in
period t, is quite simply:
d (t)
dt
=  (1   (t)) dt
as in period t a fraction dt of the currently uninformed, of which there are 1  (t), become
informed in a time interval of length dt.
The quantity of sales in period t is denoted by q (t). We can write the intertemporal
objective function for the monopolist as:Z 1
0
e rtp (t) q (t) dt:
For the informed buyer with valuation ; we have the payo¤s given by:Z 1
0
e rtdi (t) (v   p (t)) dt :
Finally, the payo¤s to an uninformed buyer are given by:Z 1
0
e rtdu (t) (v (t)  p (t)) dt;
as long as she remains uninformed and as above for the informed once she observes the
signal.
In the absence of aggregate uncertainty, the price and aggregate sales process are de-
terministic. The individual buyer however faces uncertainty regarding the random time at
which she will receive new information.
3 Value and Option Value
We are interested in the Markov perfect equilibria of the dynamic game between the monop-
olist and the buyers. In this section we rst describe the intertemporal decision problems
by the agents in terms of familiar dynamic programming equations. We then focus on the
learning problem of the uninformed buyers and decompose his intertemporal decision into
a ow value due to consumption and an option value due to experimental learning.
3.1 Value Functions
We start by describing the decision problem of the informed buyers. These buyers have com-
plete information about their true valuation  of the object. The value function, V  ( (t)),
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of the informed agent with valuation , is represented by dynamic programming equation
which poses only a static decision problem for the buyer:
rV  ( (t)) = max f   p ( (t)) ; 0g+ dV

d (t)
d (t)
dt
: (1)
The decision whether to buy or not to buy is solved by the myopic decision rule: buy
whenever  exceeds the current price p ( (t)). The only intertemporal component in this
equation (the second term) reects the e¤ect of a change in the composition of the market
segments,  (t) and 1    (t), on the future utilities. The future utilities of the informed
buyers are a¤ected by the change in the size of the segments as the future prices of the seller
responds to changes in the aggregate demand. Yet these changes are beyond the control
of any single (informed) buyer and hence the myopic rule characterizes optimal behavior.
The current size of the informed market segment,  (t) 2 [0; 1], is the state variable of the
model. We shall omit the indexation with respect to the time index t and simply write all
value functions as a function of  rather than  (t), or:
rV  () = max f   p () ; 0g+ dV

d
d
dt
:
In contrast, for the uninformed buyer, a purchase of the new product represents a bundle,
consisting of the ow of consumption and the ow of information. The value function V u ()
of the uninformed buyer is given by:
rV u () = max
n
v   p () + 

EV  ()  V u ()

; 0
o
+
dV u
d
d
dt
: (2)
The additional element in value function, compared to the one of the informed buyer with
valuation , represents the value of information. A purchase in the current period t generates
an inow of information at rate . Conditional on receiving the signal, the uninformed
becomes informed. In consequence the new value function becomes V  () for some  2
[l; h]. Yet, from the point of a currently uninformed, there is uncertainty about his
true valuation  and thus to assess the expected gain from the information, we take the
expectation with respect to  and write EV  (). The informational gain attached to a
current purchase is thus given by:


EV  ()  V u ()

:
9
The above di¤erence is always weakly positive as the informed buyer can always do at least
as well as the uninformed one. As a result, the maximal price that the uninformed buyer is
willing to pay in any given period is (weakly) above the myopic value v:
The value function of the rm is denoted by V (). We describe the rms dynamic
programming equation in two parts to separate the intertemporal considerations as cleanly
as possible. The basic trade-o¤ facing the rm is that sales are made at a single price in
two separate market segments. If the rm decides to sell to the uninformed buyers as well
as some informed ones, the relevant equation is given by:
rV () = max
p()2R+
fp () [1  +  (1  F (p ()))]g+ dV
d
d
dt
; (3)
subject to
p ()  v + E

V  ()  V u ()

.
Here (1  ) is the share of uninformed buyers in the population and  (1  F (p ())) is the
fraction of informed buyers that are willing to buy at prices p () : The constraint on the
price p () guarantees that the uninformed buyers are indeed willing to purchase at prices
p () :
If the monopolist gives up on the uninformed buyers and sells to the informed segment
only, then her value function satises:
rV () = max
p()2R+
fp () (1  F (p ()))g : (4)
In this latter case, the size of the informed segment, , remains constant and d=dt = 0,
since the ow of information to the uninformed buyers has stopped. The Markovian prices
in this regime must remain constant.
We shall therefore approach the problem of optimal intertemporal pricing as one of
optimal stopping. The monopolists task is to decide how long to sell the product in the
uninformed market segment. With these preliminaries, we can dene:
Denition 1 (Markov Perfect Equilibrium)
A Markov Perfect Equilibrium of the dynamic game is a pair (d; ; p) such that the problems
(1)-(4) are simultaneously solved for all  and :
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3.2 Option Value
The qualitative behavior of the market and the nature of the optimal pricing policy can
be characterized dichotomously in terms of an option value. More precisely, we shall argue
that the key question is whether the uninformed are willing to buy at the static monopoly
prices. We denote by bp the optimal monopoly price in the static model where each buyer
knows his valuation for the object. We refer to this as the perfect information model. In
other words, bp solves the problem:
bp 2 argmax
p2R+
fp (1  F (p))g :
We recall that the revenue function p (1  F (p)) is assumed to be strictly quasiconcave in
p and thus the above optimization problem has a unique solution bp. The static equilibrium
quantity, denoted by bq, is given by bq = 1  F (bp).
The key element in the analysis is the willingness to pay of the uninformed relative to
the static equilibrium price bp. As the segment of informed agents is growing, the segment
of uninformed is decreasing and will eventually cease to be the critical factor for the pricing
policy. There are two possible reasons why the uninformed buyers might not be the marginal
buyer in the market: either they may be priced out of the market, or they may become
inframarginal buyers. The question as to which of these two events will occur in equilibrium
will be determined by the option value the uninformed assigns to a last, marginal, purchase
of the new good.
We can compute the option value explicitly on the basis the (maximal) willingness to
pay of the uninformed, denoted by w (). The willingness to pay can be obtained from
the dynamic programming equations of the informed and uninformed buyer, (1) and (2),
respectively. As we compute the willingness to pay of the uninformed, we do not pursue
the optimal policy of the seller and hence do not solve his value function. We simply want
to ask how much the uninformed would be willing to pay if the seller would sell to the
uninformed in every period. The value function of the uninformed is then given by:
rV u () = max
n
v   w () + 

EV  ()  V u ()

; 0
o
+
dV u
d
d
dt
: (5)
The maximal willingness to pay w () at  (t) = , is the price at which the uninformed is
indi¤erent between buying and not buying, or solving for indi¤erence in (5):
w () = v + 

EV  ()  V u ()

:
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If the uninformed is charged his maximal willingness to pay in every period, then he is
indi¤erent between buying and not buying in every period. The value function of the unin-
formed is then constant at V u () = 0 for all  and naturally dV u=d = 0. In consequence,
we can insert these values into the dynamic programming equation (5) to obtain
0 = v   w () + 

EV  ()  0

, 8 2 [0; 1] . (6)
The willingness to pay, w (), is now given by the same condition in every period, and
hence permits a constant solution w () , w for all  2 [0; 1]. The continuation value of
the informed buyer is the expected discounted value of the purchases at a price equal to the
willingness to pay of the uninformed, or
EV  () =
1
r
Emax f   w; 0g . (7)
The maximal willingness to pay, w, is given as the solution to equation (6) after using (7):
w = v +

r
Emax f   w; 0g . (8)
The equation (8) has a unique solution as the left hand side is strictly increasing and the
right hand side is strictly decreasing in w. The willingness to pay w is then dened on the
basis of the primitives of the model itself, namely r; ; and F (). The excess willingness
to pay over and above the expected value of the product, w   v, represents the option
value of the current purchase for the uninformed buyer if all future prices are given by the
willingness to pay of the uninformed customers.
We now relate the willingness to pay of the uninformed to themarginal willingness to pay,
denoted by bw. The marginal situation we consider is a nal time t at which the uninformed
can buy the new good, after which the seller o¤ers the product only to the informed agents.
(The argument supposes that the seller can discriminate between informed and uninformed
buyers. This simply facilitates the representation of the problem but the possibility on the
basis of the identity is not used in the equilibrium analysis.) For this arbitrary marginal
time t, with  (t) = , we now compute the willingness to pay by the uninformed. We
observe that after period t, the seller will optimally o¤er his product at price p = bp as
this will maximizes the revenue from the informed agents. We can now again use the value
function (5) to compute the marginal willingness to pay, bw, at  (t) = :
rV u () = max
n
v   bw + EV  ()  V u () ; 0o+ dV u
d
d
dt
:
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As the continuation value of the uninformed is, by hypothesis, V u () = 0; and the value
function of the informed is, similar to (7), given by
EV  () =
1
r
Emax f   bp; 0g ;
the marginal willingness to pay is given as a solution to:
v   bw + 
r
Emax f   bp; 0g = 0;
or after rearranging: bw = v + 
r
Emax f   bp; 0g . (9)
The marginal willingness to pay bw is again dened on the basis of the primitives of the
model itself, namely r; ; F () and the optimal static price bp. The marginal willingness to
pay, bw, and the willingness to pay, w, can be related to the optimal static price bp through
(8) and (9) as follows: either (i) bw < w < bp or (ii) bw = w = bp, or (iii) bw > w > bp. We shall
refer henceforth to case (i) as a low option value environment and to (ii) (by convention)
and (iii) as a high option value environment. It is natural to think of the high option value
case as a market where the buyers are initially optimistic about the product. The low option
value case is then a market with a relatively more pessimistic clientele.
The ranking of the marginal willingness to pay relative to the willingness to pay and
the optimal static price is quite intuitive. If the willingness to pay is below the optimal
static price, then the marginal willingness bw must satisfy bw < w as the option value in the
computation of the marginal willingness to pay arises from the relatively high optimal static
prices rather than the relatively lower willingness to pay. Similarly, the ranking is reversed
when the willingness to pay exceeds the optimal static price.
An immediate consequence of the denitions is the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 (Option Value)
The (marginal) willingness to pay, w and bw, are increasing in  and decreasing in r.
4 Equilibrium
In the following equilibrium analysis we employ the dichotomy between low and high op-
tion value to represent the optimal launch strategy as the solution to a specic stopping
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problem. In Subsection 4.1, we begin with the strategy for the low option value and con-
tinue in Subsection 4.2 with the high option value. The equilibrium prices and quantities
are analyzed in Subsection 4.3. Finally we show in Subsection 4.4 that the unique Markov
perfect equilibrium is essentially the only subgame perfect equilibrium of the game.
4.1 Low Option Value
We start the equilibrium analysis with the low option value case, where the willingness to
pay is below the static optimal price, or bw < bp. All buyers are uninformed at t = 0 and it
is clearly in the monopolists best interest to sell to the uninformed segment. Over time,
many of the uninformed buyers become informed and the market begins to look more like
the complete information market. Eventually, the monopolist will then nd it advantageous
to charge a price close to the static monopoly price. If the option value is low, this implies
that the uninformed segment stops buying because the equilibrium price bp is higher than
the willingness to pay bw. In consequence, the monopolist has to decide how long he wishes
to serve the uninformed market segment before he stops selling to the uninformed. The
problem for the monopolist then becomes a stopping problem, in which he has to determine
the critical market size for the informed segment. At the stopping point, denoted by b, the
optimal price policy switches from bw to bp.
Next we describe the marginal conditions which characterize the stopping point b. Sup-
pose that at b the monopolist is indi¤erent between charging bw or bp: By selling dt additional
units of time to the uninformed, the prot to the monopolist is given by:
((1  b) bw + b bw (1  F ( bw))) dt
+
e rdt
r
(b+  (1  b) dt) ((1  F (bp)) bp) :
Since p[1   F (p)] is strictly quasiconcave and since bw < bp; it is never optimal to charge a
price below bw: If it is optimal to stop selling to the uninformed at b; the prot from this
strategy must equal the prot from stopping at b, which is given by
b (1  F (bp)) bp
r
:
Requiring the equality of these two expressions yields:
(1  b) bw + b bw (1  F ( bw)) = b   (1  b)
r

(1  F (bp)) bp: (10)
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If we denote by  (p; ) the ow prot to the monopolist from price p when  is the fraction
of informed buyers, then the above equation can be written as
 (bp; b)   ( bw; b) =  (1  b) (1  F (bp)) bp
r
: (11)
This equality has a simple economic intuition. The left hand side represents the di¤erential
gains from extracting surplus from the informed agents and the right hand side represents
the benets from building up future demand. The later is the long term gain from an
additional inow of  (1  ) informed buyers of whom [1   F (bp)] are willing to purchase
at complete information monopoly prices. As the right hand side is positive for all interior
values of bp; we conclude that with low option values, the monopolist sacrices current prots
to build up future demands.
By the optimality of the complete information price bp; we have at  = 1:
 (bp; 1)   ( bw; 1) > 0.
By continuity, it then follows immediately from equation (11) that the optimal stopping
point b satises b < 1 and in equilibrium a positive proportion of buyers, (1  b) will
remain uninformed forever and will eventually be priced out of the market. Since both bp andbw are independent of ; the comparative statics of the optimal stopping point determined
by equation (11) are straightforward to calculate.
Lemma 2 (Stopping Point with Low Option Value)
If bw < bp, then:
1. b < 1;
2. b is increasing in  and decreasing in r.
4.2 High Option Value
We now consider the case of a high option value where bw  bp. As the willingness to pay
exceeds the static complete information price, the uninformed buyers continue to make
purchases even if the price is set optimally with respect to the informed buyers. The high
option value by the uninformed buyers provides a motive for the monopolist to o¤er higher
prices than the complete information price bp. Initially, as the informed segment does not
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yet exist, he will then o¤er prices which will leave the uninformed agents just indi¤erent
between buying and not buying. The monopolist can thus extract initially all the surplus
from current purchases of the uninformed agents. As the size of the informed segment
grows, any price which leaves the uninformed indi¤erent, will lead to a substantial shortfall
in revenue from the informed segment relative to the revenue resulting from the optimal
price bp for the informed segment. The monopolist therefore has to determine at which point
he start to leave surplus to the uninformed buyers and set his price below their willingness
to pay in order to attract a larger share of informed buyers.
To start the analysis in this case, we denote the current willingness to pay by the
uninformed buyers by w () where  is the current fraction of informed buyers. By the
same argument as in the previous subsection, w () satises the following equation
v   w () + 

EV  ()  V u ()

= 0
as long as indi¤erence between purchasing and not purchasing holds. The ow revenue of
the seller is then given by
 (p; ) = (1  ) p+  (1  F (p)) p, (12)
provided that p  w () and is given by
 (p; ) =  (1  F (p)) p
if p > w (). In other words as long as the price does not exceed the willingness to pay of
the uninformed, the seller sells to both segments, and only at a price higher than w (), the
uninformed segment drops out. As the option value is high, it follows that p () > w ()
is never optimal as w () > bp by hypothesis, and thus the only reason to charge p () > bp
is the marginal revenue from the uninformed. The monopolist does not deviate downwards
(locally) from the full extraction prices p = w () as long as:
@ (w () ; )
@p
 0,
or
1     (w () f (w ()) + F (w ())  1) : (13)
As the static revenue function p (1  F (p)) is assumed to be strictly quasiconcave, it follows
that the local condition is a global condition as well. It is also clear that for each xed w (),
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this equation holds for  small. As a result, the optimal sales path starts always with initial
sales to the uninformed at the full extraction price. Once the inequality in (13) is reversed,
the optimal price setting just follows from solving:
1  +  (1  F (p)  pf (p)) = 0: (14)
The second order conditions for maximization imply as usual that the equilibrium price
is decreasing as the number of informed buyers is increasing. As  ! 1, the equilibrium
price converges to the myopic equilibrium price bp. We observe that even though this has
the avor of a static optimization problem, the dynamics of the model still enter into the
determination of prices through the evolution of :
The problem of the monopolist is not quite solved yet since the variable w () in (13)
is endogenous. It is computed on the basis of the equilibrium continuation values and thus
relies not only on local but also on global information about the equilibrium price path. We
can then compute the stopping point by matching the prices resulting from full extraction
and the optimal price when the marginal buyer is the informed buyer.
Lemma 3 (Stopping Point with High Option Value)
If bw  bp, then:
1. b  1;
2. b is decreasing in  and increasing in r:
If we compare the comparative static results in Lemma 2 and 3, then it is worth observing
that the stopping points move in opposite directions as a function of r and . Consider
therefore an initial distribution of valuations so that the same model generates both low
and high option values for di¤erent values of the discount rate r. For very high discount
rates, the learning stops very early and very few buyers are informed. As the discount rate
decreases the seller becomes more patient and the buyers value the information more, so
that the initial price will be higher and learning will proceed for some time. Eventually
r will become so high that the option value exactly equals the static optimal price, or
w = bw = bp and the price will be constant for all t and b = 1. As r decreases even further,
the optimal pricing strategy changes in nature. The option value for the uninformed buyers
increases so that the price at which the uninformed buyer is still willing to buy increases as
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well. If the seller then maintains the uninformed buyer as the marginal buyer, he sets the
price too high to receive substantial sales from the informed buyers. In consequence, he will
drop the price below the option value as soon as there are a su¢ cient number of informed
buyers. As r decreases, the problem gets worse and it is optimal to have the informed
buyers as marginal customers earlier. The stopping point b then drops again below 1, but
this time the uniformed customers become inframarginal rather than excluded buyers. The
comparative statics are simply reversed for . In Figure 1, the increasing part of the graph
corresponds to the high option value case and the decreasing part belongs to the low option
value case.
Insert Here Figure 1: Stopping Point for Varying r .
4.3 Equilibrium Price
Next we describe the dynamics of the prices and quantities directly in terms of the time
coordinate t. This allows us to discern the intertemporal patterns of the two cases in a more
transparent manner. Consequently, the equilibrium variables are written here as function
of time t rather than the state variable  (t). Yet, in equilibrium, the state variable  (t) is
a deterministic and monotone function of time t, and hence the mapping from  (t) to t is
immediate. With either a low or a high option value, the uninformed buyers are indi¤erent
between purchasing and not purchasing in the initial periods until  (t) = b. From the
value functions we can deduce the di¤erential equation that governs the prices prior to b.
This leads us to the characterization of the intertemporal properties of the price path and
the path of sales.
Proposition 1 (Evolution over Time)
1. p (t) satises for all t with  (t)  b:
_p (t) = r (p (t)  v)  Emax f   p (t) ; 0g : (15)
2. p (t) is decreasing and concave in t for all  (t) < b;
3. q (t) is initially decreasing and convex in t.
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Our interpretation of the two qualitatively di¤erent price path goes as follows. In the
high option value case, the monopolist skims the high valuation buyers in the market (the
uninformed buyers) with a high and declining price. In the low option value case, the
monopolist makes introductory o¤ers to increase the number of goodwill customers once
the price is raised. It should be noted that with low and high option value, the prices do
not change by large amounts before b and as a result, adjustment costs to changing prices
might well force the monopolist to adopt a two price regime with low initial prices followed
by higher prices in the low option value, and high prices followed by low prices with high
option value.
The intertemporal pricing policies are graphically depicted in Figures 2 and 3 for low
and high option value, respectively. The regular lines describe the equilibrium price and
the dotted line the commitment price as a function of time. The commitment price path is
discussed in detail in Section 5. With the low option value, the introductory price slowly
decreases until it reaches a value equal to the marginal option value and at that point, the
seller ceases to pursue new customers and sells only to informed customers with su¢ ciently
high valuations. With the high option value, the discount factor r is very small, and hence
the option value for the uninformed buyer is almost constant. In consequence, the price
declines very slowly (and in the graph it almost appears as a constant) until the seller begins
to seek sales more aggressively from the informed customers. At this point, the price begins
to decrease more rapidly and eventually converges to the static monopoly price.
Insert Here Figure 2: Equilibrium Price for Low Option Value
Insert Here Figure 3: Equilibrium Price for High Option Value
Notice also that our model provides a theoretical predictions for the joint movements
of prices and equilibrium quantities. These e¤ects should be taken into account when
estimating the demand for new products. If one estimates a static demand function for
a product using data that includes observations of prices for  < b; it is clear that the
resulting estimators are biased. Hence the dynamics of the market demand ought to be
taken into account when estimating e.g. the consumer surplus from recently introduced
products.
The equilibrium characterization also allows for a fairly complete picture of the asymp-
totic behavior of the equilibrium.
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Proposition 2 (Asymptotic Behavior)
1. limt!1 p (t) = bp,
2. limt!1 q (t) = bq if bw  bp;
3. limt!1 q (t) < bq if bw < bp:
This proposition shows immediately how the model with forward looking behavior di¤ers
from the myopic model. Even though the long run behavior of the prices is similar in the
myopic model, it is clear that the convergence to the myopic quantities is more likely with
forward looking behavior since bw > v: In the low option value case, the long run sales with
myopic buyers would, in fact, be always lower than in the current forward looking model.
The following corollary shows that the optimistic (pessimistic) case is characterized by
prices above (below) the perfect information monopoly price level at all points.
Corollary 1
1. If bw < bp, then p (t)  bp for all t.
2. If bw > bp, then p (t)  bp for all t.
4.4 Uniqueness of Equilibrium
In this subsection, we show that the equilibrium characterized in the previous sections
remains the only sequential equilibrium outcome of the game, even after removing the
earlier Markovian restriction on the strategies.5 The key to understanding this result is our
informational assumption that only own past purchases and the aggregate market data are
available to the players. The implication of this is that the continuation paths of play are
independent of the choices of any individual buyer. Hence trigger strategy equilibria of the
type where all buyers refuse high prices as long as all buyers have refused high prices in the
past are not consistent with equilibrium.
5Note that the game is formally one of incomplete information. Hence if we follow the canonical model
of incomplete information, the resulting extensive form game has no proper subgame and the distinction
between subgame perfect and Nash equilibrium disappears. In a sequential equilibrium, the behavior of all
players is optimal after all conceivable (private) histories.
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Before we argue the uniqueness result formally, it might helpful to see how the restriction
to aggregate purchase decision a¤ects the determination of the equilibrium policies. For the
informed buyer the myopic decision rule to buy if and only if the value of the object is
larger than the current price is a strictly dominant strategy in the game for arbitrary beliefs
about future price paths. This follows from the fact that the pricing policy cannot depend
individual purchases.
Given the decision rule of the informed buyers, a su¢ cient statistic for the monopolists
pricing in any period t is the maximal willingness to pay of the uninformed buyers. The
current willingness to pay may be quite arbitrary if the monopolists strategy conditions
future prices on the current price in a nontrivial manner. As long as the uninformed
buyers are the marginal buyers, the monopolist already extracts the maximal surplus from
the buyers in the Markov Perfect Equilibrium. The only remaining room for di¤erent
equilibrium values and policies to arise is therefore after the uninformed buyers cease to
be the marginal buyers. But again, in this region, the monopolist makes the optimal
intertemporal decision given the size of the informed market segment.
The precise argument to establish uniqueness uses again the distinction between low
and high option value. We present the argument fully for the low option value case and
comment on the di¤erences for the optimistic case.
Lemma 4 For low option value, bw < bp, the maximal willingness to pay for the uninformed
buyers (over all future continuation price paths) is strictly below bp:
In the proof of this result, it is also shown that the maximal willingness to pay for the
uninformed buyers obtains when the price path makes the uninformed indi¤erent between
buying and not buying at all future points. As the size of the uninformed segment is
decreasing over time and their willingness to pay is below bp, we next establish that for all
subgame perfect equilibria, there is a maximal size of the informed segment, e < 1, such
that for all   e, the monopolist will nd it optimal to set the price p (t) = bp.
Lemma 5 For the low option value,
1. there exists e < 1 such that p (t) = bp in any equilibrium if  (t) > e;
2. there exists T <1 such that p (t) = bp for all t  T:
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The upper bound e on the informed market segment naturally translates into a nite
upper bound T on the time horizon such that after T the seller is guaranteed to charge
the perfect information price bp. With this result in place, the innite horizon game can be
analyzed as a nite horizon game and it is now easy to prove the uniqueness claim.
Proposition 3 (Uniqueness)
Every sequential equilibrium has the same equilibrium path as the unique Markov Perfect
equilibrium path.
The argument for the case of a high option value is very similar and hence omitted.
The central step is again a truncation argument. Only this time, it shows that there is a
nite upper bound T at which the uninformed cease to be the marginal buyers, but stay
in the market, and the equilibrium pricing rule will again revert to a myopic pricing rule,
derived earlier in (14), but one which still relies on the size of market segments,  and
1  , respectively. Using a backward induction argument, it can again be shown that the
stopping point must coincide for all subgame perfect equilibria with the one derived for the
Markov Perfect equilibrium.
5 Commitment and Welfare
The optimal equilibrium policies of the monopolist evidently lead to distortions relative
to the e¢ cient allocation. The ine¢ ciency of the equilibrium allocation per se does not
come as a surprise as already the static equilibrium leads to distortions due to the marginal
revenue considerations of the monopolist. Yet, two new sources of ine¢ ciencies emerge in
the intertemporal analysis. First, in the low option value, a substantial proportion of the
uninformed buyers are eventually priced out of the market and do not have a su¢ cient
amount of time to learn their true valuations. Second, in the initial phase of the game,
the seller raises prices above the static optimum so as to extract the option value of the
purchases accruing to the uninformed buyers. This leads to further ine¢ ciencies among the
informed buyers.
These new distortionary e¤ects emerge from the intertemporal trade-o¤s faced by the
seller. For this reason, we now ask whether these ine¢ ciencies can be overcome when the
seller has the ability to commit himself to an entire future price path at the beginning of
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the game, at t = 0. The objective in this section is then to determine the commitment
policy of the seller and compare it with the earlier, time-consistent, equilibrium policies.
The qualitative features of the solution in the model with commitment are quite di¤erent
from the equilibrium solution in the previous section for the low option value case. For high
option value case, the di¤erence is much smaller and as a result, we provide the full analysis
of the low option value case and simply comment on the solution for the high option value.
At the outset of the game, the monopolist commits to a price path p (t) ; where we use the
upper bar to make the distinction to the sequentially rational case. Each p (t) induces a
choice path for the uninformed as well as for the informed consumers. Again, it is clear
that there is an optimal Markovian strategy for the monopolist and to conform with the
notation of the previous sections, we denote the commitment price path by p ().
Since we are not allowing for price discrimination elsewhere in this model, we do not
consider other forms of commitment such as committing to an intertemporal two part tari¤
or di¤erential prices to rst time buyers and existing clientele. Nonetheless we would like
to point out that with the initial homogeneity among the buyers, a simple two part tari¤
would allow the seller to extract all the surplus from the consumers and implement the
e¢ cient allocation. The seller could simply charge the consumer up-front with an initial fee
equal to their surplus and in exchange o¤er them a commitment to provide the product at
a price equal to marginal cost in all future periods. This solution clearly relies heavily on
the initial homogeneity and the ability of the consumer to pay large up front fees.
We start the analysis of the commitment policy by showing that in the low option value
case, the buyers receive no surplus in equilibrium. The following lemma states that in the
early phase of the game, the uninformed buyers must be indi¤erent between purchasing and
not purchasing. This is quite intuitive as all the buyers are uninformed in the beginning
and since the share of the informed increases continuously in time.
Lemma 6 (Ind¤erence) There exists a  > 0 such that for the optimal price path p () ;
V u (0) = e rV u ( ()) :
With this lemma in place, it is easy to show that in the low option value case, the
expected payo¤ of the uninformed buyer in equilibrium is initially equal to zero. This
result follows from the fact that in the low option value case, w < bp and hence an increase
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in the current price results in a higher current revenue from both market segments (if at
the original prices, the uninformed prefer strictly to make a purchase). We can extend this
result to show that along the optimal price path, the uninformed buyer is always indi¤erent.
By the arguments of the previous section, we then know that this implies a constant price
path and hence the solution is quite di¤erent compared to the equilibrium solution of the
previous section.
Proposition 4 (Commitment with Low Option Value)
In the low option value case,
1. the expected value of the uninformed buyer is V u (t) = 0;
2. the optimal commitment price is constant for all  2 [0; 1] :
p () = w.
The above argument is not valid for the high option value case. It is easy to see that
the rst result in Proposition 4 cannot hold generally for the high option value case. While
the central ideas in the high option value case are the same as in the low option value case,
the arguments are slightly more cumbersome. For this reason, we only provide a summary
of the results for that case.
Proposition 5 (Commitment with High Option Value)
In the high option value case, the optimal commitment price path is
p () = w for all ;
or
p ()! bp as ! 1:
We conclude this section by discussing the welfare implications of the above proposi-
tion. In the high option value case, the commitment price is always above the equilibrium
price. To see this, notice rst that by Lemma 6, we know that initially along the optimal
commitment price path, the uninformed buyers are indi¤erent between purchasing and not
purchasing. It is easy to show that it is never optimal to commit to leaving surplus to the
uninformed buyer at an earlier date than in the equilibrium solution. Consider next the
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points where the monopolist prices according to the myopic pricing rule. Since the myopic
price is chosen optimally, there are no rst order instantaneous losses from charging a higher
price. Since the myopic price is below the uninformed buyersmaximum willingness to pay,
an increase of dp in current prices results in a higher willingness to pay in the earlier pe-
riods. The monopolist can thus extract extra surplus from the uninformed through higher
prices in the earlier periods. Since the prices are higher than in the equilibrium model, total
surplus in the model decreases as a result of the commitment possibility. The commitment
price path is represented as a dotted line in Figure 2 and 3 and illustrates the systematic
di¤erence between time consistent and commitment policies.
In the low option value case, ex ante expected consumer surplus is zero in the commit-
ment model and in the equilibrium model. Hence the monopolist extracts full social surplus
in both cases. A revealed preference argument is then su¢ cient to show that commitment
is good for the social surplus.
Proposition 6 (Welfare)
The monopolists ability to commit to a price path decreases social welfare with a high option
value and increases social welfare with a low option value.
6 Stationary Model
So far, we have been concerned with the dynamic demand behavior of innitely lived agents
who learn over time their true valuation for a new product. We have described the optimal
pricing policy for the introduction of a new product. While the buyers are ex ante identical
in their expected valuation of the new product, their personal experiences eventually lead
them to have heterogeneous and idiosyncratic valuations.
In this section, we consider a market with a constant inow and outow of consumers.
This naturally expands the scope of our analysis as many products face a constant renewal
in their customer base, either because of the ageing of the customers or other systematic and
age-related changes to the agentspreferences. In the following, we analyze the steady state
equilibrium and omit the description of the transition path (this is obtained by combining
the prior analysis with the steady state). A market of this type can be thought of as
a market for an established experience good. The steady state equilibrium consists of a
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constant proportion of informed buyers, denoted by , and a, possibly random, price
policy p.
We model the change in the population by constant entry rate  of new customers and
equal exit rate  of old customers. The new customers are all initially uninformed and
become informed according to the same information technology as in the previous sections.
The old customers, informed and uninformed, leave the market at rates proportional to the
current population, or  and (1  )  respectively.
The characterization of the equilibrium price policy can be given again using the notion
of option value. The willingness to pay w of the uninformed agent is naturally being adjusted
by exit rate  which increases the e¤ective discount rate from r to r + :
w = v +

r + 
Emax f   w; 0g :
The uninformed buyers are willing to buy at any constant price p provided that p  w.
The option value is again said to be high if bp  w and conversely is said to be low if bp > w.
When the option value is high, it is protable to sell to the uninformed in all periods.
The equilibrium policy of the seller can be described as the solution to a static optimization
problem
p = argmax
p2R+
fp ((1  ) +  (1  F (p)))g ; (16)
subject to p  w and the steady state proportion  is given by
 =

 + 
.
By the high option value property, the uninformed are always willing to pay more than
the static monopoly price bp. For this reason, the seller seeks to nd the optimal balance
between extracting surplus from the uninformed and maintaining a high sales volume from
the informed. The optimal price p is the unique solution (by the quasiconcavity property
of the static monopoly problem) in this trade-o¤. It can be veried that p is decreasing in
 as a larger  leads the monopolist to give more weight to the informed customers and
hence lower the price p to bring it closer to bp.
For the low option value environment, the analysis is more subtle and may involve a
random price policy by the seller. The low option value property suggests that the seller
may not want to sell to the uninformed in all periods but rather extract surplus from the
informed agents. With a constant inow of new customers, the seller cannot abandon the
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new customers altogether as this would imply a diminishing customer base. If the inow of
new customer occurs only at a moderate level, then the optimal pricing policy will randomize
between a low price p, at which the uninformed buyers are indi¤erent between buying and
not buying, and a high price bp which optimally extracts surplus from the informed agents.
We denote the respective steady state probabilities by x and 1 x.6 The resulting steady
state proportion of informed customers is given by:
 =
x
 + x
. (17)
With the random price policy, the low price p is determined by the indi¤erence condition
of the uninformed buyer. The indi¤erence condition is simply the option value augmented
by the fact that the seller alternates between a low price p and a high price bp:
p = v +

r + 
(x  Emax f   p; 0g+ (1  x) Emax f   bp; 0g) : (18)
If new customers enter at a high rate, then most customers will be uninformed in steady
state and it will never be optimal to charge the optimal static price bp as too few informed
customers exists. It is then in the monopolists best interest to give up on extracting surplus
from the informed agents and o¤er in all periods the low price p to the uninformed agents.
In this case, the probability of high price is zero, or 1   x = 0, and the low price is then
simply determined by the maximal willingness to pay of the uninformed, or:
p = v +

r + 
Emax f   p; 0g ;
and hence p = w. We can summarize our ndings in the following proposition. The
complete set of equilibrium conditions, including the equilibrium value functions of the
seller are detailed in the proof.
Proposition 7 (Steady State)
The steady state equilibrium is characterized:
1. in the low option value environment by a (possibly) random price choice fp; bpg with
p < bp and all uninformed agents buying only at the lower price p;
6Our notion of random prices in a continuous time model can be though of as being the limit of a model
where each time interval of length dt is split into subintervals of lengths xdt and (1  x) dt where the prices
are set to p and bp respectively. A similar construction can be found in e.g. Keller & Rady (2003)
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2. in the high option value environment by a constant price p 2 (bp; w] and all uninformed
agents buying in all periods.
The comparative static behavior of the steady equilibrium variables follows the logic
in the trade-o¤ for the seller. The equilibrium price for the uninformed agents, p, the
probability of its occurrence, x, and the steady state proportion, , are all decreasing in
r. In Figure 4, the equilibrium probability x of making a price o¤er p is denoted by a
solid line. The equilibrium prices p and bp which are in the support of the random pricing
policy are represented by the dotted lines.
Insert Here Figure 4: Steady State Policies Depending on r
The behavior in  and  is more subtle as a change in  or  a¤ects the steady state
fraction of informed buyers directly. It can be shown that x is increasing in , but  and
p are decreasing in  and the opposite behavior can be established for .7
In interpreting the mixed strategy equilibria of the low option value case, it may be
helpful to think about the implications for a discrete time model. With discrete time, the
equilibria would be in pure strategies and they would take the form that below the steady
state level  of informed buyers, the monopolist sells to both market segments and above
, she extracts rent from the informed segment at full information monopoly prices. Hence
the qualitative prediction of price dispersion is valid for that model as well.
The steady prices of the high option value case are in accordance with the typical
predictions for perishable goods monopolies. The dispersed prices of the low option value
case are more common in models of durable goods with entry of new buyers. For example
Sobel (1991) shows that equilibria in the durable goods case take the form that occasionally,
the good is sold to a large part of the clientele and in the intervening periods, the price is
set to skim the surplus from the high valuation buyers. In this light, our model indicates
that when buyers are initially optimistic about the quality of an experience good (the high
option value case), the market outcomes are similar to those with perishable search goods.
7The last result holds if the expected value of the object is positive, or v  0: If v < 0, then an increase
in the entry and exit rate, will eventually force the willingness to pay of the uninformed below zero. In
consequence, the seller wishes to sell to the informed eventually at an increasing rate, further lowering the
probabilitiy of sale at a low price, and in equilibrium no sales will occur at all even though it would be
socially e¢ cient to transact.
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When buyers are more pessimistic, the durable nature of the information purchased in
combination with the good becomes more important and the market outcomes share some
characteristics with durable goods markets.
Finally, we briey comment on the role of commitment in the steady state environment.
As in the earlier section, we again label the relevant commitment variables as , p and x
to distinguish them from the equilibrium variables. The optimal steady state commitment
policy is given as the solution to:
max
(x;p)
fx (1  F (p)) + (1  x)bp (1  F (bp))g ,
subject to
p  v + 
r + 
(x Emax f   p; 0g+ (1  x) Emax f   bp; 0g) ; (19)
and
 =
x
 + x
.
The constraints on the revenue maximization simply represent the willingness to pay and
the steady state proportion of informed buyers.
In the high option value environment, it is obvious that the seller cannot do better
than pursuing the time consistent price policy. While he could extract more revenue from
the uninformed, he prefers not to increase the price so as to maintain a reasonably high
sales volume from the informed sellers. And indeed the solution to the time consistent
price policy was found by solving the static optimization problem (16) with the solution of
x = x = 1 and consequently p = p = w. However, in the low option value environment,
he would like to commit to higher probability x of o¤ering low prices to the uninformed and
the equilibrium price p would then be determined by an equality in the condition (19). A
higher probability of sales x relative to x would translate into a higher willingness to pay
by the uninformed, or p < p. The reason that the seller cannot maintain the commitment
policy in a time consistent equilibrium is that he would be tempted to o¤er high prices to
informed more often than planned and this lowers the willingness to pay by the uninformed
as the frequency of favorable prices is low. In consequence, the commitment solution would
display  > , and thus share the same welfare enhancing properties commitment had in
the low option value environment with a constant group of buyers.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that the optimal sales policy of a monopolist in a model of
experience goods is qualitatively di¤erent depending on whether the buyers are initially
optimistic or pessimistic about the good. With pessimistic buyers, it is in the monopo-
lists best interest to build up a su¢ cient base of goodwill clientele. To achieve this, the
monopolist sacrices current prot by pricing low in order to nd new future buyers. The
durability of information about the product quality thus plays a key role in this situation.
In the optimistic case, managing information is less important as the uninformed buyers
have a high option value and are willing to buy at the static optimal prices. In this case the
monopolists optimal price path can be seen as an attempt to skim the uninformed segment
of the market until the informed segment becomes overwhelming large.
We have kept the model as simple as possible in order to highlight the dynamics of price
setting. The modeling strategy of the current paper could be used to investigate models
with more general specications for either the buyers valuations of the product or the
strategic environment. An interesting instance of a more general demand structure would
be one where the buyers di¤er in their willingness to pay for quality, but the perceived
quality is idiosyncratic and must be learned over time. Regarding the competitive structure
of the model, the natural next step would be consider the role of idiosyncratic learning in a
strategic environment against either a known or similarly unknown product. An interesting
variation of the current model and of special importance for the pharmaceutical market
would be to consider optimal pricing when a competitor will only appear in T periods
hence, induced by the expiration of the patent, see Berndt, Ling & Kyle (2003) for an
empirical analysis of this situation.
An interesting direction for further research would be to analyze a multi-product mo-
nopolist directly in the steady state model. In many industries, di¤erent versions of the
same product are o¤ered in a given market. For example in the software industry, some
of these varieties are meant to be o¤ered to rst time users and contain restrictions such
as time limitation, limited computing power and alike. The steady state with monopolistic
discrimination, in terms of either quantity or quality, could then analyze the optimal prod-
uct menu in the presence of new and old customers. The regular adverse selection problem
would then contain a novel dynamic element as some consumer do not yet know their true
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valuation for the product.
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8 Appendix
The appendix collects the proofs of all the results in the main body of the paper. For
notational convenience, we shall adopt a standard notation from probability theory by
writing:
(   p)+ , max f   p; 0g .
Proof of Lemma 2. (1.) The optimal stopping point is given as a solution to (10) by:
b = bw + r bp (1  F (bp))bwF ( bw) + bp (1  F (bp))  1 + r  : (20)
For simplicity we dene  , r , and with this we rewrite equation (20) as:
b = bw + bp (1  F (bp))bw + (1 + ) bp (1  F (bp))  bw (1  F ( bw)) ; (21)
which shows that b < 1 since bp (1  F (bp))  bw (1  F ( bw)) > 0.
(2.) After replacing bw by its explicit expression given in (9), we rearrange equation (21)
to get:
b   v + E (   bp)+F  v + E (   bp)++ bp (1  F (bp)) (1 + )
= v + E (   bp)+ + bp (1  F (bp)) : (22)
Di¤erentiating the equality (22) implicitly with respect to  yields:
db
d
( bwF ( bw) + bp (1  F (bp)) (1 + )) + b  ( bwf ( bw) + F ( bw))E (   bp)+ + bp (1  F (bp))
= E (   bp)+ + bp (1  F (bp)) ;
and hence
db
d
=
E (   bp)+ (1  bF ( bw)  b bwf ( bw)) + (1  b) bp (1  F (bp))bwF ( bw) + bp (1  F (bp)) (1 + ) :
The denominator is clearly positive. For the numerator, we observe that 1   bF ( bw)  b bwf ( bw) is the derivative of the prot function p (1  b+ b (1  F (p))) evaluated at bw,
which is positive by the assumed quasiconcavity of p (1  F (p)) together with the fact thatbw < bp. Therefore, the numerator is also positive, as needed.
Proof of Lemma 3. (1.) Suppose that for all   b, the marginal buyer is an informed
buyer. The equilibrium price p () is then given as the solution of to the static revenue
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maximization problem (14). The value function of an informed buyer at  (t) =  is:
V  () =
Z 1
t
e r( t) (   p ( ()))+ d ;
The expected value of the informed buyer at  (t) =  is:
E
h
V  ()
i
=
Z h
l
Z 1
t
e r( t) (   p ( ()))+ d

dF () .
In contrast the value function of the uninformed informed buyer for a particular realization
T  t of the signal arrival time, is given by:Z T
t
e r( t) (v   p ( ())) d +
Z h
l
Z 1
T
e r( t) (   p ( ()))+ d

dF () : (23)
The value function of the uninformed buyer is obtained from (23) by taking the expectation
over all signal arrival times T  t, or V u () is given by:Z 1
t
Z h
l
Z T
t
e r( t) (v   p ( ())) d +
Z 1
T
e r( t) (   p ( ()))+ d

dF ()e TdT:
The willingness to pay for all   b is given by:
w () = v + 
h
EV  ()  V u ()
i
.
The di¤erence in the value functions, EV  ()   V u (), can therefore be written, using
the above expressions as:
EV  ()  V u () =
Z 1
t
Z h
l
Z T
t
e r( t) (p ( ())  )+ ddF ()e TdT: (24)
The gain of the informed vis-a-vis the uninformed buyer, arises in all those instances where
the uninformed buyer accepts the o¤er by the seller even though his true valuation is below
the equilibrium price. It follows that w () is decreasing in  (and t) as p () is decreasing
in  (and t). We can then run w () backwards as long as w ()  p (), where we recall
that p () is determined by (14).
The stopping point b is the smallest  at which
w () = p () . (25)
We next argue that there is a unique stopping point b, by showing that w () and p () are
single crossing. By hypothesis of bw > bp, we have
w (1) > p (1) : (26)
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Observe further that
lim
#0
p () = +1.
The maximal willingness to pay, w () ; is a constant v and a discounted average over future
prices p (), represented by (24). It therefore follows that, provided p () is monotone,
p0 () > w0 () ;
which together with (26) is su¢ cient to guarantee existence and uniqueness of the stopping
point.
(2.) We observe rst that p () is independent of r. It follows that r a¤ects the
expression, EV  ()   V u (), only through discounting. As an increase in r decreases
w (), it follows that the intersection (25) is reached later and thus at a higher value of b.
The argument for  is similar except for the obvious reverse in the sign.
Proof of Proposition 1. (1.) The di¤erential equation (15) for the full extraction prices
has a unique rest point, _p (t) = 0, at p (t) = w as w uniquely solves:
0 = r (w   v)  Emax f   w; 0g .
(2.) We show the monotonicity of p (t) separately for bp < bw and bp  bw. We start with
the later case and argue by contradiction. Thus suppose that p (0) > w, then p (t) > w > bw
for all t. It follows that at  = b, we have p (b) > w > bw, but at a (t) = b we have to
have p (b) = bw for the uninformed buyer to be willing to buy and this leads to the desired
contradiction.
Consider then bp < bw and consequently bp < w < bw. Suppose that p (0) > w and hence
by the di¤erential equation p (t) > w for all t with  < b. We also recall that as the
equilibrium price path is continuous, it follows that at  such that p () = w > bp, we have
w () > p (). From Lemma 3 we recall that the equilibrium during the full extraction
phase satises
p () = v + 
h
EV  ()  V u ()
i
,
or more explicitly:
p () = v + 
Z 1
t
Z h
l
Z T
t
e r( t) (p ( ())  )+ ddF ()e TdT:
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For notational ease we shall denote by R (t) the foregone utility benet from being
uninformed in period t (i.e. the regret) or
R (t) ,
Z h
l
(p ( (t))  )+ dF () ;
and the equilibrium price is then given by
p (t) = v + 
Z 1
t
Z T
t
e r( t)R () de TdT:
By hypothesis p (t) is strictly increasing until t = bt where   bt = b and decreasing there-
after. It is immediate that R (t) shares the monotonicity properties with p (t). We next
show that p (t) cannot be monotone increasing for all t < bt. After integrating with respect
to T , we get
p (t) = v + 
Z 1
t
e (r+)( t)R () d :
Di¤erentiating with respect to t we get
p0 (t) = 

 R (t) + (r + )
Z 1
t
e (r+)( t)R () d

;
which has to turn negative as t " bt by the hypothesis of an increasing price for all t < bt and
the continuity of the price path. This delivers the desired contradiction. The concavity in
t follows immediately from p (0) < w and the di¤erential equation (15).
(3.) The equilibrium sales are given by:
q (t) = (1  ) +  (1  F (p (t)))
as long as the uninformed buyers are participating. The equilibrium sales are governed by
the following di¤erential equation:
q0 (t) =   (1  )F (p (t))  f (p (t)) p0 (t) .
It follows that, even though p0 (t) < 0; for all  su¢ ciently small, q0 (t) < 0. The second
derivative is given by
q00 (t) = (1  )F (p (t))2 2 (1  )f (p (t)) p0 (t) 
h
f 0 (p (t))
 
p0 (t)
2
+ f (p (t)) p00 (t)
i
and again for all  su¢ ciently close to zero the convexity of the sales follows directly from
the decreasing price.
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Proof of Corollary 1. It follows directly from di¤erential equation (15) that if bp < bw,
then bp < w < bw and likewise if bp > bw, then bp > w > bw. The asserted inequalities then
follow from the monotonicity behavior of the prices as established in Proposition 1.
Proof of Lemma 4. Recall that the maximal willingness to pay, ew; by the uninformed
buyers for an arbitrary continuation price path ep = (ep (s))1s=0 is given by
ew = v + E V  (ep)  V u (ep) : (27)
We claim that the right hand side of this equation is maximized if ep is such that
ep (t) = v + E V  (ep (t))  V u (ep (t)) ; (28)
for all t; where ep (t) denotes the continuation price path from t onwards. To see this,
observe that if p (t) > ep (t) ; then p (t) could be reduced for an instant dt, thus increasing
V  (ep (t)) while leaving V u (ep (t)) unchanged (and thus increasing V u (ep (t)) by less than
V u (ep (t))). A similar argument shows that an increase in p (t) reduces V u (ep (t)) by more
than V  (ep (t)) if p (t) < ep (t) :
Along this path, only a constant ep (t) = ep for all t solution is consistent with (15). By
assumption of the low option value case,
bp > w;
we have bp < bp, which concludes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 5. (1.) By Lemma 4, the maximal price from the uninformed is strictly
below bp: By the strict quasiconcavity of p[1  F (p)]; there is an e such that for all  > e;
we have: ep = arg max
p2R+

p(1  F (p)) + (1  ) Ip<p0
	
;
where IA denotes the indicator function of the event A and p0 is an arbitrary price such
that p0 < ep: The right hand side of the equation is an upper bound on the revenue from a
market with  > : Since the maximum of this upper bound is achieved at p = ep; the claim
is proved.
(2.) In light of the rst part of the current lemma , we only need to show that it is never
optimal to sell to the uninformed buyers at far away dates. From the previous Lemma, we
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know that if the uninformed buyers buy innitely often, then there must be an 0 <  < 1
such that
lim
t!1 (t) = 
0:
Consider then period t" such that  (t") = 0  ": By the same logic as in the previous part,
it must be the case that p (t) = ep, for all t  t" is optimal for " small enough.
Proof of Proposition 3. By Lemma 5, there is a smallest time T <1 such that p (t) = ep
for all t  T:8 For all periods, t < T; the choices for the monopolist can be calculated by
backwards induction as for the Markov perfect equilibrium. Since at T; the monopolist must
be indi¤erent between selling to the uninformed and not selling to them in all sequentially
rational equilibria, the point of stopping must be the same as in the Markovian problem.
Proof of Lemma 6. As a starting point, observe that there is a  0 > 0 such that for all
t <  0; the uninformed buy along the optimal path. Suppose now that the claim in the
Lemma is not true. Then, for all " > 0; we can nd a  " < " such that the uninformed
buyers have a strict preference to buy. Fix " and consider a  such that " >  > 0. Dene
" by:
 (") = :
As in the previous section, the instantaneous prot to the monopolist can be written as:
(1  )minfw () ; p ()g+ [1  F (p ())]p () ;
where w () is the maximal willingness of the uninformed to pay. It is thus clear that for a
small enough ; the optimal instantaneous price is w () whenever t < ": But then if  is
small enough and the uninformed buyers strictly prefer to buy at some  <  " ; it must be
the case that p () < w () contradicting optimality.
Proof of Proposition 4. (1.) Let  be as in the previous lemma. Consider a moment
t >  such that the uninformed buyers strictly prefer to buy for all t0 2 ( ; t) : In the low
option value case, we know then that p ( (t)) < w < pm: By the quasiconcavity of the
full information prot function, the revenue from the informed buyers increases if the price
in t is increased slightly. Since the uninformed uninformed strictly prefer the purchase at
price p ( (t)) ; they are also willing to purchase at slightly higher prices. Furthermore, the
8 If the smallest such time does not exist, we can use the inmum over times T that satisfy Lemma 5.
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decision of the uninformed buyers in previous periods is unchanged since by the argument in
Lemma 4, the option value of the previous purchases is increased by the price raise. Hence
a change to p ( (t)) + dp in period t results in an increase in the prot of the monopolist
contradicting the assumed optimality of p ().
(2.) According to the rst part of this Proposition, V u () = 0 for all . The revenue
to the monopolist is thus equal to the expected consumer surplus accruing to an individual
consumer when informed. Prot maximization thus implies that it is optimal for the mo-
nopolist to maximize consumer surplus for the informed subject to the constraint that the
uninformed get an equilibrium payo¤ of zero. But this implies constant pricing at w.
Proof of Proposition 7. (1.) A steady state (Markov perfect) equilibrium for the model
can be calculated from the following three conditions. First of all, steady state implies a
balanced ow to the pool of informed buyers:
 (1  )x = 
or
 =
x
 + x
:
The uninformed buyers must be indi¤erent between buying and not buying at price p :
p = v +

r + 
fxEmax f   p; 0g+ (1  x)Emax f   bp; 0gg : (29)
Finally, the value function of the seller is given by
rV () = max
8<: p (1   +  (1  F (p))) + dVd d

dt+
;bp (1  F (bp)) + dVd ddt 
9=; (30)
where
d
dt+
= (1  )   > 0;
and
d
dt 
=   < 0.
The rst term in the maximand (30) represents sales at a low price in which the uninformed
agents buy and accompanied by an inow and outow into the group of informed agents:
d
dt+
= (1  )   > 0.
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The second term in the maximand (30) represents sales at a high price. The uninformed
agents will not buy at the high price and hence there is only an outow from the segment
of informed agents:
d
dt 
=   < 0.
If x 2 (0; 1), then the seller is indi¤erent between pursuing either of the two pricing
strategies and hence the values of the two policies have to be equal:
p (1  F (p)) + dV
d
d
dt+
= bp (1  F (bp)) + dV
d
d
dt 
;
which allows us to obtain the derivative of the value function as:
dV
d
=
bp (1  F (bp))  p (1  F (p))
(1  ) ;
which simply states that the marginal value of an informed agent is given by the di¤erence
between the revenue from an informed and an uninformed agents divided by the rate at
which uninformed agents become informed. (The derivative V 0 () can be positive or
negative in a steady state with a random price policy. If it is positive, it indicates that sales
to the informed are of more value than to the uninformed and hence leads to fewer sales to
the uninformed. If it is negative, it enhances sales to the uninformed.)
In equilibrium the value function of the seller is given by the expectation over the
revenues:
rV () = xp (1  F (p)) + (1  x) bp (1  F (bp)) + dV
d
d
dt
:
With the randomized strategy
d
dt
= (1  )x    = 0;
and hence the equilibrium is exactly equal to the expected revenue. We then obtain a second
expression for the derivative of the value function of the seller and this time it involves the
probabilities x by which the seller randomizes by di¤erentiating both sides with respect to
, or:
rV 0 () = (1  x) bp (1  F (bp))  xpF (p) + d2V
(d)2
d
dt
+
dV
d
d
dt
d
(31)
The second term on the rhs vanishes as d

dt = 0 and the derivative of
d
dt with respect to
d is given by
d
dt 
d
=
d ((1  )x   )
d
=  x   ;
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and hence we can rewrite (31) as:
V 0 () =
(1  x) bp (1  F (bp))  xpF (p)
r +  + x
:
By requiring that the marginal value of an informed agent is equalized in equilibrium, we
obtain
(1  x) bp (1  F (bp))  xpF (p)
r +  + x
=
bp (1  F (bp))  p (1  F (p))
(1  ) (32)
which together with the indi¤erence condition of the uninformed buyer, (29), jointly deter-
mine the equilibrium price and probability (p; x).
Finally, we can determine whether or not the equilibrium involves randomization by
verifying that the seller has no protable deviation to switch at x = 1 by rewriting (32) as:
p (1  F (p))  bp (1  F (bp)) + pF (p) (1  )
r +  + 
, (33)
where p is given as solution to (29) under the hypothesis that x = 1.
(2.) With the equilibrium conditions established, it remains to verify that the pure
strategy p = p is a steady state equilibrium provided that w  bp. Clearly, a su¢ cient
condition for (33) to hold is that it holds at p = bp :
bp (1  F (bp))  bp (1  F (bp)) + pF (bp) (1  )
r +  + 
,
or cancelling terms: bp  bp + bpF (bp) (1  )
r +  + 
.
For a given , the inequality is most di¢ cult to satisfy with r =  = 0, and it thus su¢ ces
to verify that bp  bp + bpF (bp) (1  ) ,
which clearly holds as F (bp)  1.
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Figure 1: Figure 1: Stopping Point for Low Option Value
 

r < 5
1
4

and High Option Value
 

r  514

for Varying r .
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Figure 2: Figure 2: Intertemporal Price Path for Low Option Value
( equilibrium price path,    commitment price path)
44
Figure 3: Figure 3: Intertemporal Price Path for High Option Value
( equilibrium price path,    commitment price path)
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Figure 4: Figure 4: Steady State Policies for Varying Discount Rate r
( probability x;    low price p;    high price bp)
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